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Exclusion by Other Means:
Medical Testing and Chinese Migration 
to Canada, 1947-1967
LAURA MADOKORO*
The end of the so-called “Chinese Exclusion Era” in Canada (1885-1947) did 
not lead automatically to open and free migration. In the absence of overtly race-
based discriminatory policies, Canadian officials in the early 1950s required 
migrants from the People’s Republic of China to produce an additional set of 
costly medical exams. This paper explores the impact of this targeted medical 
discrimination against Chinese migrant families. It investigates the manner in 
which medical tests were structured and looks specifically at how government 
officials varyingly understood the uses, and the reliability, of the results over two 
decades of immigration reform.
La fin de ce qu’il est convenu d’appeler la « Période d’exclusion des Chinois » 
au Canada (1885-1947) n’a pas automatiquement mené à une migration ouverte 
et libre. À défaut de politiques discriminatoires ouvertement fondées sur la race, 
les fonctionnaires canadiens du début des années 1950 exigeaient néanmoins des 
migrants de la République populaire de Chine une série supplémentaire d’examens 
médicaux coûteux. Le présent article traite des effets de cette discrimination 
particulière contre les familles de migrants chinois. Il étudie la structuration des 
examens médicaux et analyse spécifiquement les interprétations diverses qu’en 
ont tirées les fonctionnaires quant à l’emploi et à la fiabilité des résultats pendant 
une période de vingt ans de réforme de l’immigration.
IN 1956, A 24-YEAR-OLD Chinese male was hospitalized at the lazaretto in 
Tracadie, New Brunswick. A previous resident of the People’s Republic of 
China, Hong Kong, and Toronto, the man was described as “rather apprehensive 
and suspicious” with “extensive skin lesions.”1 Concerns about the individual, 
compounded by language difficulties, impeded doctors in their efforts to confirm 
*  Laura Madokoro is Assistant Professor in the Department of History and Classical Studies at McGill 
University. The research and writing of this article was made possible by funding from the Social Sciences 
and Humanities Research Council. The author also wishes to thank the co-editors of the special issue and 
the two anonymous reviewers for their important suggestions. 
1 Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), Department of Health (hereafter DH), RG 29, Vol. 3425, 
File 854-4-060, “Medical History Report” completed by Dr. A. Robichaud, December 22, 1956.
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the man’s identity. They resorted to securing his original immigration records. 
Photographs used in the man’s immigration application, as well as copies of 
X-rays submitted in Hong Kong as part of the application process eventually 
enabled medical authorities to confirm that the individual had been diagnosed 
with chronic bronchitis at the time he applied to move to Canada. Although a 
review of his medical history revealed “that he had skin lesions which first became 
noticeable in 1947 … at the time of this immigration medical examination, no 
definite signs were noted by the roster doctor in Hong Kong.”2 
The use of X-rays to confirm the identity of the individual in care (who 
was suspected of tubercular, but treatable, leprosy) was an ancillary benefit of 
the growing bureaucratic apparatus around medical screening and testing in 
Canada in the postwar period. That the individual was originally from China was 
significant, for in the formal post-exclusion era,  following the repeal of the Chinese 
Immigration Act in 1947, Canadian authorities emphasized the increasingly race-
neutral and open character of their immigration selection processes, even as they 
used advances in technology to create additional barriers for Chinese migrants, 
whom they still considered undesirable for permanent residence in Canada 
in significant numbers.3 In doing so, the federal government perpetuated the 
bureaucratic and cultural barriers identified by Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds 
in Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the International 
Challenge of Racial Equality that shaped the politics of exclusion among white 
settler societies from the late nineteenth century.4 
To shed light on how the federal government achieved exclusion by means 
other than statutory legislation, this article focuses on the evolving use of medical 
testing as a technology of exclusion from 1947 to 1967.5 These two decades are 
critical for understanding the role of race in shaping regulatory change, for they 
are bookended by the formal end of the Chinese exclusion era in Canada and the 
creation of universal selection and admission criteria for family class migrants. 
Medical testing provided immigration authorities with tools to simultaneously 
dissuade and investigate migration from China, and this has important implications 
for how we understand the character of the post-exclusion period in Canada. 
2 LAC, DH, RG 29, Vol. 3425, File 854-4-060, W.H. Frost, Chief, Quarantine, Immigration Medical and 
Sick Mariners Service to Dr. W.R. Baskerville, Acting Chief, Admissions Division, Immigration Branch, 
April 24, 1957.
3 Although Chinese exclusion officially ended in 1947, continued discrimination in immigration law, 
regulations, and their application endured until 1978.
4 Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the 
International Challenge of Racial Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
5 As a technology of exclusion, medical testing was also a technology of control and governance. See Renisa 
Mawani, “Screening out Diseased Bodies: Immigration, Mandatory HIV Testing, and the Making of a 
Healthy Canada,” in Alison Bashford, ed., Medicine at the Border: Disease, Globalization and Security, 
1850 to the Present (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 136. Marjory Harper has also written about 
the specific way in which discrimination operated based on ethnic stereotypes. Discrimination based on 
ethnic stereotyping was of long standing in Canadian immigration practice, not least towards Chinese 
immigrants. See, for instance, Marjory Harper, “Ethnicities and Environments: Perceptions of Alienation 
and Mental Illness Among Scottish and Scandinavian Settlers in North America, c. 1870–c. 1914” in 
Marjory Harper, ed., Migration and Mental Health: Past and Present (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2016), pp. 105-127.
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Managing family class migrants from China raised all kinds of administrative 
difficulties for the Canadian government and other white settler societies because 
decades of exclusion had encouraged an industry in the creation of fraudulent 
“paper son” family trees and fake documentation, making it difficult to determine 
with certainty the identity of individuals applying to immigrate to Canada. In 
contrast to how medical testing was used for migrants from the United Kingdom, 
the entire medical screening program for migrants from the People’s Republic 
of China, and relatedly Hong Kong, was premised on the idea of othernesss, 
difference, and foreignness.6 
In considering the use of medical admissibility requirements for the express 
purpose of excluding Chinese migrants from Canada, this article details the 
shift from medical testing that focused on excluding and quarantining particular 
contagions to its eventual use in verifying the identity and claimed authenticity of 
family class migrants from China. In doing so, the article attends to the temporal 
implications of this shift. The intensified use of technology in regulating the 
movement of Chinese migrants, including the introduction of special X-rays for 
Chinese migrants in 1950 and blood testing in 1954, coincided with reluctant efforts 
in Canada to open the doors to migration from Asia. These efforts were contested 
amongst various bureaucrats and medical experts charged with administering and 
interpreting medical tests, and they ultimately changed the landscape in which 
exclusion was considered. The use of these technologies persists in the present-
day, but by the 1960s, the federal government was far more willing to treat the 
results as grounds for conditional inclusion rather than outright exclusion. 
The Politics of Exclusion
The shift from the blatantly racist aspirations of white settler societies in the 
late nineteenth century to more subtle interpretations of race and desirability is 
reflected in the evolution of medical admissibility requirements in the postwar 
period and the sometimes contradictory ways in which officials in different 
branches of global screening regimes interpreted the grounds for admission and 
exclusion. After the Second World War, white settler societies confronted the 
growing reality that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to justify the 
exclusion of particular migrants on the basis of race. From the late nineteenth 
century, authorities in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and 
South Africa had introduced legislation to deny the admission of migrants from 
Asia, about whom they had concerns as permanent settlers. They employed 
various strategies to prevent settlement, including capitation taxes, dictation 
6 See, for example, records pertaining to migrants from New Zealand, which document how immigration 
officers assumed a commonality of experience and exposure and went out of their way to facilitate, rather 
than impede, migration. LAC, DH, RG 29, Vol. 3425, 854-3-54. Reservations similar to those found in 
documentation on the testing of Chinese migrants are apparent in files documenting migration from other 
parts of the world that Canadian officials did not considerable desirable, most notably Africa. This is 
particularly striking in discussions of medical testing at the time of the Ugandan Asian refugee movement 
in 1972, which the federal government encouraged because of the highly skilled professionals involved in 
the expulsion from Uganda. At the same time, there was considerable anxiety about diseases endemic to 
Africa and the potential for a health scare in Canada. See LAC, DH, RG 29, Vol. 3425, 854-3-36. 
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tests, and requirements for extensive documentary evidence to support claims for 
admission. These programs remained largely untouched until the Second World 
War. In 1943, the United States repealed exclusionary legislation that targeted 
Chinese migrants specifically. Other white settler societies took similar steps 
beginning in 1947, though various administrative and regulatory barriers remained 
in place for decades. 
The wartime alliance as well as the emerging human rights agenda of the 
postwar period, the spirit of which was captured in the 1948 Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, meant that the exclusion of Chinese migrants from most white 
settler societies (apartheid South Africa would become a notable exception) was 
irreconcilable with the emerging rights discourse that emphasized equality of 
treatment for all. As a result, the 1952 Walter-McCarran Act, the 1953 Refugee 
Act, and the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act in the United States, the 
introduction of a points system for skilled workers in Canada in 1962, and 
the official end of the White Australia Policy in 1973 are often treated as the 
inevitable outcome of a linear narrative of progress.7 However, as a number of 
scholars have demonstrated, governments fiercely resisted the processes by which 
the structures of white settler societies were dismantled—concerned as they were 
about developing societies along particular racial, social, and economic lines.8 A 
critical reassessment of this period suggests that the shift to seeming universality 
was not nearly as smooth, or inevitable, or even universal as the shift in legislation 
portended. There was a great deal of opposition and debate over the reforms, much 
more than the eventual statutory shifts might suggest. Examining exactly how 
change was effected, and to what extent, reveals the challenges in dismantling the 
structures of power that were so critical in animating the foundational hopes and 
aspirations of white settler societies. 
Medical admissibility regulations have a long history of working to exclude, 
rather than include, migrants from permanent settlement.9 Indeed, medical 
admissibility requirements were central to how white settler societies regulated 
the admission of migrants who would build, and reproduce, the future nation. 
Among white settler societies, the earliest exclusionary legislation governed not 
only race-based admissions but also made it clear that physically and mentally 
unfit migrants were undesirable. Australia’s 1901 Immigration Restriction Act, 
for instance, prohibited the entry of “any idiot or insane person” or “any person 
suffering from an infectious or contagious disease of a loathsome or dangerous 
character.” This same Act introduced a dictation test that specifically targeted 
Chinese migrants. It required arriving migrants to write “a passage of fifty words 
7 Patricia Roy, The Triumph of Citizenship: The Japanese and Chinese in Canada, 1941-1967 (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2006); Gwenda Tavan, The Long, Slow Death of White Australia (Melbourne: Scribe 
Publications, 2005). 
8 Renisa Mawani, Colonial Proximities (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009); Henry Yu, “Refracting Pacific 
Canada: Seeing our Uncommon Past,” BC Studies, no 156-157 (Winter-Spring 2007-2008), pp. 5-10; 
Nandita Sharma, Home Economics: Nationalism and the Making of ‘Migrant Workers’ in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2006). 
9 On exclusion, see Alison Bashford, “At the Border: Contagion, Immigration, Nation,” Australian 
Historical Studies, vol. 33, no. 120 (2002): pp. 344-358; Alan Kraut, Silent Travelers: Germs, Genes and 
the Immigrant Menace (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995). 
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in length in an European language directed by the officer.”10 It was left to the 
discretion of the officer to determine the language of the test, but the idea was to 
make it as difficult as possible for Chinese migrants to gain admission to Australia. 
Part of the reason that white settler societies feared significant migration from 
China was that diseases and pathogens were themselves racialized, which meant 
that migrants were subject to different kinds of medical admissibility tests and 
treatments.11 Scholars have shown how in the United States Chinese migrants 
were subject to more invasive examinations than those arriving from Europe 
and the United Kingdom at Ellis Island throughout the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.12 
In Canada, Chinese migrants were subject to two regulatory regimes: one 
designed specifically to exclude them from permanent settlement and one designed 
to establish the character of migrant desirability more broadly. Beginning in 1885, 
Chinese migrants were required to pay a head tax upon admission to Canada. 
The idea was that the punitive tax would curtail migrant aspirations. When this 
tax failed to deter Chinese migrants entirely, the government banned almost all 
migration to Canada in 1923, with the exception of merchants, diplomats and 
their wives, as well as students. Alongside this pointed racial exclusion, Canadian 
efforts to regulate the physical health of migrants as a whole began shortly after 
Confederation in 1867. While the first piece of federal legislation, the 1869 
Immigration Act, represented the most liberal piece of migration legislation in 
post-Confederation Canada, its broad, and undefined outlook on admissions 
was soon refined. The 1869 Act referred generally to “immigrants” but made 
no mention of who would be allowed to enter and who would be denied entry. 
Every subsequent piece of legislation, however, marked a narrowing of either 
the “immigrant” category, which was first defined in legislation in 1906, or the 
terms of admission.13 Crucially, as the government began to define who could 
10 1901 Immigration Restriction Act, accessed December 17, 2016, http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/
resources/transcripts/cth4ii_doc_1901a.pdf.
11 The association of particular groups with certain diseases continues in the present day. Alison Bashford 
argues that this is largely due to geopolitical reasons. See Bashford, “Introduction” in Bashford, Medicine 
at the Border, p. 1. However, other scholars point to long histories of exoticizing and othering certain 
groups as reasons for the particularly strong reaction to the presence of diseases “within,” as was the 
case in Toronto, Canada during the SARS outbreak in 2002. In this regard, Carolyn Strange refers to 
“a historically-coded and racially-loaded struggle over representation” in “Postcard from Plaguetown: 
SARS and the Exoticization of Toronto,” in Bashford, Medicine at the Border, p. 221. See also Charles T. 
Adeyanju and Nicole Neverson, “‘There Will Be a Next Time’: Media Discourse about an ‘Apocalyptic’ 
Vision of Immigration, Racial Diversity, and Health Risks,” Canadian Ethnic Studies, vol. 39, no. 1-2 
(2007), pp. 79-105.
12 Erika Lee and Judy Yung, Angel Island: Immigrant Gateway to America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012). Moreover, Nayan Shah has convincingly demonstrated how public health regimes in the United 
States targeted Chinese migrants, perpetuating perceptions of ill-health and unsanitary living conditions. 
See Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco’s Chinatown (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2001). 
13 An immigrant was “any steerage passenger or any ‘work-a-way’ on any vessel whether or not entered 
as a member of the crew after the vessel has sailed from its first or last port of departure, any saloon, 
second class passenger or person who having been a member of the crew has ceased to be such who upon 
inspection is found to come with any class liable to exclusion from Canada, and any person arriving in 
Canada by railway train or other mode of travel; but it does not include any person who has previously 
resided in Canada or who is a tourist merely passing through Canada to another country.”
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be considered an immigrant, it also began defining the exclusion of migrants in 
general terms. 
With the 1906 Immigration Act, the government made exclusion on the 
grounds of physical condition explicit. In addition to barring a broad spectrum 
of individuals, including prostitutes and their procurers, and anyone who was 
“feeble-minded”, epileptic, or insane, the Act also prohibited migrants who were 
“afflicted with any loathsome disease, or with a disease which is contagious or 
infectious, or which may become dangerous to the public health,” or persons 
who were “deaf and dumb or dumb, blind or infirm” unless they had enough 
money, a suitable profession, or belonged to a family accompanying him already 
in Canada.”14 Subsequent legislation refined this early effort at prohibition on 
medical grounds.15 
In Canada, the creation of a National Department of Health in 1919 led to the 
expansion of the medical screening process, including the appointment of full-time 
federal government Medical Officers. Until the Second World War, the officers’ 
focus was on examining new arrivals at ports of entry, but the sheer demand on 
the system meant that the examinations were cursory at best. Moreover, the cost of 
deporting those deemed medically inadmissible prompted extensive discussions 
about the effectiveness of the entire process. Beginning in the 1920s, Canadian 
officials identified doctors in the United Kingdom, and migrants were encouraged 
to be examined by these physicians prior to departure.16 Predeparture examinations 
were compulsory only for unaccompanied women, children, and government-
assisted passage. Examinations were not mandatory for most but, if successful, 
they facilitated the entry process for everyone involved, expressly migrants and 
the officials responsible for screening them. Deportations were so complicated 
and costly that after pursuing 590 deportations in 1927, the Canadian government 
determined to post medical officers abroad to perform the screening. Crucially, 
officers were only posted to Europe—facilitating the migration of people from 
Paris, Danzig, Antwerp, Riga, and Hamburg but not Shanghai or Tokyo. The 
geographic location of medical officers in Europe meant that migration from that 
region was facilitated, while migration from Asia was not. 
Postwar Chinese Exclusion in Canada
The immediate post-Second World War period witnessed major population 
movements as people recovered from the ravages of war and sought security and 
economic prosperity abroad. As a result of the sheer number of people moving, and 
questions about their physical and mental well-being, particularly in the case of 
displaced persons in Europe, there was a renewed emphasis on screening overseas 
14 An Act Respecting Immigration and Immigrants, S.C. 6, c. 19, accessed December 16, 2016, http://www.
pier21.ca/research/immigration-history/immigration-act-1906.
15 The same approach applied to the treatment of colonial bodies. See Warwick Anderson, Colonial 
Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2006). 
16 For details on the prescreening process, see Robert Vineberg, “Healthy Enough to Get In: The Evolution 
of Canadian Immigration Policy Related to Immigrant Health,” Journal of International Migration and 
Integration, vol. 16 (2015), pp. 279–297.
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to secure physically and mentally able individuals for the work force and avoid 
costly, and complicated, deportation processes for individuals deemed unfit. The 
1952 Immigration Act, and associated regulations, governed the testing of migrants 
for medical admissibility to Canada. The Immigration Medical Services branch 
of the Department of National Health and Welfare was tasked with performing 
medical examinations on prospective immigrants and classifying them, under the 
requirements of the new Act, according to any clinical abnormalities uncovered. 
Migrants classified under category 5(b), for example, were considered medically 
inadmissible. Crucially, medical officers also assumed heightened discretionary 
powers under the new act, responsible for providing advice to visa officers 
regarding the significance of any medical conditions and their potential impact 
on the “migrant’s expected future in Canada.”17 Section 5(b) was instrumental 
in shaping the discretionary powers afforded immigration officers responsible 
for managing the immigration program. Under section 5(b), migrants could be 
excluded outright from admission or they could be required to submit to ongoing 
surveillance upon their entry and settlement in Canada. Significantly, section 
5(b) was loosely phrased and open to considerable interpretation, complicating 
the smooth functioning of the immigration program. As late as 1972, officers 
complained of the difficulty of making “useful recommendations” without proper 
“interpretation or administrative direction” with regard to the kinds and degrees 
of health impairment that properly could be mentioned.18 
In addition to these regulatory and statutory shifts, the government developed 
regulations that enabled migrants outside Europe to use locally sanctioned 
doctors, approved by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, to secure 
medical tests and proceed with their applications to Canada. This decision enabled 
a growing number of Chinese migrants to seek entry to Canada following the end 
of exclusion in 1947, a date that coincided with the difficult rebuilding process 
in the Pacific theatre and tumultuous conditions in war-torn China, where civil 
war had raged, with occasional interruptions, since 1937. These conditions, and 
the eventual establishment of a communist regime in Beijing, meant that the 
Canadian government continued to be extremely wary, and therefore vigilant, 
about migration from China. 
This anxiety was fueled by the experience of white settler societies in trying 
to manage and limit permanent Chinese settlement from the late nineteenth 
century on. The introduction of various taxes and barriers to entry encouraged 
the growth of paper son schemes. These schemes relied on the production of false 
documentation, including papers and photographs that suggested the existence of 
family relationships (namely father-son connections), which did not really exist. 
Often, it was a nephew or a neighbor who posed as a son, becoming someone 
eligible for entry. The lack of reliable documentation in China, including birth and 
marriage certificates, facilitated these schemes. Eventually, an entire paper son 
17 Dr. Brian Gushulak, former medical officer, Government of Canada, correspondence with the author, May 
19, 2014. 
18 LAC, Immigration Program Sous-Fonds, RG 76, Vol. 1382, File 5630, Part 1, M.L. Webb, ADM Medical 
Services, NHW to R.M. Adams, June 23, 1972, on proposed procedures.
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industry developed, and it was one that operated well into the postwar period as 
migrants continued to confront barriers to admission.19 
In Canada, suspicions about the integrity of applicants from China encouraged 
the federal government to devise alternative mechanisms to limit the numbers of 
Chinese migrants admitted for entry, even after the formal end of exclusion in 
1947. The government focused its attention on family class migration in particular, 
as family sponsorship was the cornerstone of Canadian immigration policy in the 
immediate postwar period. As a result, Chinese Canadians encountered limitations 
on sponsoring family members far beyond what other Canadians experienced.20 
According to regulations passed after 1947, Chinese Canadians could sponsor 
children under the age of 21. Other migrant groups could sponsor children under 
the age of 25. The difference in age was a deliberate attempt to reduce the number 
of eligible applicants. Only persistent lobbying by leaders in the Chinese Canadian 
community, such as Wong Foon Sien—head of the Chinese Benevolent Association 
in Vancouver—led to modest change. In 1951, the government agreed to raise the 
sponsorship limit to 25 “on humanitarian grounds,” given the unsettled conditions 
in communist China.21 Crucially, the decision to make a limited concession in 
terms of the age-limits coincided with the introduction of X-ray requirements as 
part of medical examinations for all migrants to Canada in the previous year. In 
theory, this regulation applied universally but as with other regulations designed 
to regulate and limit entry in the critical postwar years, Chinese migrants were 
especially affected. 
Targeted Medical Exclusion
In 1950, the government introduced the possibility of X-rays as part of general 
medical examinations. In doing so, the Canadian government hoped to limit the 
possibility of so-called “impostors” presenting themselves for admission. Yet, 
in the case of Chinese migrants, the regulations also offered an administrative 
cover for the government’s continued desire to limit family class migration from 
China, especially following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China 
in 1949. The X-ray requirements introduced in China went above and beyond the 
tests required to secure medical admissibility to Canada. Certain diseases were 
considered endemic to China, and the medical admissions tests were designed 
to catch those of particular concern. Testing and treating such diseases was a 
rather straightforward affair. Common diseases included infestations of “different 
types of intestinal parasites, chiefly, hookworms, whipworms and roundworms.”22 
Canadian officials recognized that these “conditions are quite common in China 
19 On the development of businesses to support the migration of Overseas Chinese in the 1800s, see Elizabeth 
Sinn, Pacific Crossing: California Gold, Chinese Migration, and the Making of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong University Press, 2015).
20 Nancy Christie, “Look out for Leviathan: The Search for a Conservative Modernist Consensus,” in Nancy 
Christie and Michael Gauvreau, eds. Cultures of Citizenship in Post-war Canada, 1940-1955 (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 71.
21 LAC, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, RG 26, Vol. 125, File 3-33-7, Part 2, Memo from Laval 
Fortier to the Minister, July 27, 1955.
22 LAC, Immigration Program Sous-Founds, RG 76, Vol. 796, File 546-1-526, Part 1, H. D. Reid to Director, 
Immigration Branch, December 13, 1951.
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and are often considered as insignificant” and determined that as long as the 
conditions were treated prior to arrival in Canada, there would be no major 
medical risk. X-rays, however, were expressly intended to identify inadmissible 
migrants. Experts reassured the government that X-rays were of “real help in 
establishing age between 8 and 21 years” because bone structures varied with age 
in six regions: the shoulder (including the whole clavicle), the elbow, wrist, the 
pelvis and hip joint, the knee joint and the ankle joint.23 Given that the age limits 
of sponsorship was capped at 21, X-rays had the tangential benefit of helping to 
ascertain the authenticity of claimed family relationships. 
X-rays were difficult to secure and could only be obtained from designated 
providers. For the relatives of Chinese Canadians living in the People’s Republic 
of China, the simple requirement for an X-ray complicated their migration plans 
exponentially. Migrants had to obtain exit visas from the communist regime 
after 1951 and make their way to Hong Kong to obtain the X-ray. Immigration 
officials were well aware of the complications created by the new requirements 
even before the communist regime closed the country’s borders. In 1947, officials 
noted that the “administration of these requirements in a country such as China 
will inevitably involve delay, especially if examination centres are few.”24 In the 
immediate postwar period, there were no Canadian immigration operations on 
the Chinese mainland and those in Hong Kong were poorly resourced.25 Migrants 
often submitted to medical examinations only to discover that the validity of their 
medical certificates had expired by the time their applications were processed.26 
Equally frustrating for prospective migrants was the fact that X-ray readings 
were hardly scientific, despite claims to the contrary. As a result, migrants found 
themselves at the mercy of bureaucratic wrangling and conflicts between medical 
experts and those charged with administering admissions.27 The medical experts in 
Hong Kong and Ottawa occupied a complicated middle ground, seeking to present 
scientific opinions in a process that was rife with ambiguity and discretionary 
influence. Charges of bias and unfair treatment were frequently heard. In response, 
Dr. H. D. Reid assured his colleagues in the Admission Division of the Immigration 
Branch that his staff were “fully aware of the limitations (on radiology) and, in 
order that no injustice be done, have always erred on the safe side in expressing 
an opinion.” He elaborated:
In stating the approximate age of an individual, we routinely give him the 
maximum benefit of the doubt that a radiological standpoint and we add to this, 
23 LAC, Immigration Program Sous-Fonds, RG 76, Vol. 796, File 546-1-526, Part 1, Drs. Anderson & 
Partners to The Superintendent, Canadian Immigration Office, September 4, 1950. This opinion was later 
affirmed by immigration officials. H. D. Reid wrote to J. D. McFarlane on October 27, 1950 and declared 
“there can be no question of the value of X-rays in establishing age between 8 and 21 years. They are 
mentioned as an aid in establishing identities in all standard works of “Medical Jurisprudence.” 
24 LAC, Department of External Affairs, RG 25, Vol. 3193, 5068-A-40, Part 2, Draft Memorandum to the 
Prime Minister, March 18, 1947.
25 Draft Memorandum to the Prime Minister, March 18, 1947.
26 See correspondence in LAC, RG 76, Vol. 796, File 546-1-526, Part 1.
27 LAC, RG 76, Vol. 796, File 546-1-526, Part 1, Acting Director to Assistant Commissioner, J. D. McFarlane, 
August 10, 1950.
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three years for variation from the normal before we state he could not have been 
born on such a date. Where the discrepancy between our estimation and the age 
claimed is under three years, but approaching three, we state that it is unlikely 
he could have been born on the date claimed. … If the X-ray demonstrates that 
the Chinese is approximately the age he claims to be (and this has been the case 
in many instances), then the taking of the X-ray is actually of some benefit to the 
Chinese, and does not give rise to any injustice, as, if an X-ray were not taken, the 
applicant would be rejected in any case.28 
Reid’s insistence on giving migrants the benefit of the doubt betrayed the 
principles upon which the use of X-rays to verify family relationships rested, 
namely that Chinese migrants could not be trusted. His efforts therefore operated 
at cross-purposes with the interests of immigration officers invested in restricting 
the number of eligible migrants to Canada. 
Apprehensions about Chinese migrants were compounded by migrant efforts 
to overcome still more obstacles in their efforts to migrate. Rumours of attempted 
corruption confirmed the already low opinion that many immigration officers 
had of the so-called “Chinese character”. From Hong Kong, Superintendent H. 
K. B. Armstrong reported to officials in Ottawa that his Chinese colleague was 
approached by a passenger broker who indicated that a “fee of US $150 had to 
be paid to me to expedite the examination.” Armstrong concluded that this was 
the applicant’s method of hinting at a bribe to “fix” the age. He alerted officials 
to the case, however, in order to highlight a difference of opinion by the medical 
experts. Dr. Flecker estimated the applicant, a Mr. Chan, to be about 21 or 22 years 
of age. Dr. Gray found him to be between 23 and 25 and most likely closer to 25. 
It is unclear from the archival record what happened to Mr. Chan, but his case is 
illustrative of how peripheral activities created suspicion about the accuracy of the 
radiology examinations.29
On another occasion, reports reached Ottawa about strategies migrants were 
employing in an effort to overcome or reverse negative decisions. In the spring 
of 1952, the District Superintendent in Hong Kong reported that the office was 
experiencing an “increase in the number of X-ray plates received from individuals 
of Chinese race in Canada with requests that previous applications rejected for 
alleged dependents be reconsidered.”30 He reported that one doctor in particular, 
a graduate from the University of Manitoba, seemed to “be developing quite a 
little business” in providing alternative X-rays, and he feared that “if we do not 
keep the situation in hand we will soon be receiving independent X-rays and 
radiologists’ reports for every case rejected at Hong Kong on account of age or 
health reasons.”31 Officials in Ottawa shared his concerns and urged that, “as 
discreetly as this can be done, applicants should be discouraged from obtaining 
28 LAC, RG 76, Vol. 796, File 546-1-526, Part 1, H. D. Reid, Chief, Division of Quarantine, Immigration 
Medical and Sick Mariners’ Services to P. T. Baldwin, Chief, Admission Division, Immigration Branch, 
June 1, 1951.
29 LAC, RG 76, Vol. 796, File 546-1-526, Part 1, H. K. B. Armstrong re. Leong Chuck Sing – No. 6809.
30 LAC, RG 76, Vol. 796, File 546-1-526, Part 1, District Superintendent to Director, Ottawa, May 13, 1952.
31 District Superintendent to Director, Ottawa, May 13, 1952.
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private opinions after a decision has been rendered on the basis of official medical 
opinion.”32 These reports affirmed existing suspicions about the integrity of the 
government’s immigration program in China. 
Managing the situation in Hong Kong from afar proved to be a considerable 
challenge for civil servants in Ottawa who regularly questioned expert medical 
opinions. H.T. Peters, the Superintendent in the Trans-Pacific region, reported in 
the fall of 1951 that under instructions issued by Dr. Flecker, who was involved 
in the case discussed above, experts estimated the age of migrants presenting 
themselves in Hong Kong at “approximately two years lower in age than that of 
Gray, the authority previously used by [the Canadian office in Hong Kong].”33 
Peters was anxious about this development because it was clear to him that over-
aged applicants were “getting by quite comfortably under this new interpretation.” 
He explained that when he “introduced this X-ray idea … the plan was to provide 
scientific backing to the judgment of the visa officers here [Hong Kong] in 
estimating age.” Several months into the experiment, however, he argued the 
“the results coming in are completely at variance with the estimations of the visa 
officers” and he therefore questioned whether it was “worth our while to continue 
to send these people for X-ray to determine age.”34
As a result, the Chief of Quarantine Services sought greater standardization 
in the analysis of radiological reports. Officials in Ottawa wanted to limit the 
scope for interpretation and advocated the use of standardized reports. Dr. H. D. 
Reid wrote the Superintendent in Hong Kong in March 1952 and insisted that 
the radiological tables “on which have been based our estimations of the age of 
Chinese are more accurate than those of the anatomists.”35 Reid suggested that 
“the anatomist had no accurate means of investigating the subject of epiphyseal 
fusion and the various tables they prepared are more or less useless from an age 
estimation standpoint. Tables based on the X-ray examination of large numbers 
of living subjects are considered to be much more suitable for purposes of age 
estimation.”36 Reid reminded his colleague that “many impostors may be the age 
they claim to be. You are also aware that very many applicants have been refused 
admission because there was a wide variation between their apparent age and the 
age they claim to be. I think X-rays have been of definite value in ruling out many 
of these persons. However, in the age group above 21 X-rays serve no useful 
purpose.”37
The archival record suggests that the interpretation of X-rays was a real source 
of tension between visa officers in Hong Kong and staff in the Immigration Branch 
in Ottawa. While officials in Hong Kong mistrusted the evidence offered by the 
32 LAC, RG 76, Vol. 796, File 546-1-526, Part 1, Director of Immigration to District Superintendent, June 16, 
1952.
33 LAC, RG 76, Vol. 796, File 546-1-526, Part 1, H. T. Peters, Superintendent, Trans Pacific to Director of 
Immigration, Ottawa, October 6, 1951.
34 H. T. Peters, Superintendent, Trans Pacific to Director of Immigration, Ottawa, October 6, 1951.
35 LAC, RG 76, Vol. 796, File 546-1-526, Part 1, Reid to Benoit, March 1, 1952.
36 Reid to Benoit, March 1, 1952.
37 Reid to Benoit, March 1, 1952. With this statement, Reid noted that “imposters” took many shapes and 
forms and that lying about their age was just one example of the ways that an “impostor” might deceive the 
system. 
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radiological exams, immigration officials in Ottawa favoured X-ray evidence 
over the interpretation made by visa officers on the ground. They disagreed on 
so many cases that by 1951, 50% of cases reviewed were being returned to Hong 
Kong. Reports from the British colony indicated that visa officers were “in a 
state approaching frustration.”38 When Reid subsequently proposed “to stretch 
to four years the period which he originally placed at three,” officials in Hong 
Kong reacted with dismay.39 Their concern was that if the proposed change was 
implemented, the “whole question” of using X-rays to identify age “becomes 
that much more intangible from our viewpoint.” Their pointed critiques proved 
convincing. Officials concluded that since the department was dealing with 
children up to the age of 25, “the Visa Officer, after interviewing the individual 
himself, is in a much better position to deal intelligently with the case, than we in 
Ottawa.”40 
As noted by Reid in his correspondence with officials in Hong Kong, X-rays 
were of no use to the Canadian government for sponsored children over the age 
of 21, and in 1955 the government again reduced the sponsorship age to 21 (after 
having briefly allowed sponsorships up to the age of 25 on “humanitarian grounds” 
in the wake of the establishment of a communist regime in Beijing) following 
reports of false representations by people claiming to be the relatives of Chinese 
in Canada. This decision was facilitated by the introduction of blood tests in 1954, 
which—in theory—were designed to detect the presence of syphilis. However, 
they could also be used to verify the validity of claimed family relationships. 
Technologies that were first introduced to test for potential pathogens evolved 
into technologies of control and governance that could assist the government in 
screening, and limiting, the numbers of family class migrants who made their way 
to Canada. 
Testing the Family
Blood tests provided the government with a new way to verify familial relationships 
beyond the close scrutiny of supporting documentation, intensive interviews, 
and the dubious X-ray results to which they had resorted previously. At first, the 
government introduced blood tests for controversial cases involving family class 
sponsorships for Chinese migrants. The tests in question were used to carry out a 
“complete blood grouping of certain Chinese persons concerning whom questions 
have been raised by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration concerning 
their parentage or their relationship to a family group.”41 Migrants were required 
to submit to blood tests for both parents and children to prove that the claimed 
familial relationships were indeed valid. As with the X-ray exams, the government 
sought to exploit the blood tests to their maximum regulatory potential. It was 
decided that when the department was seeking the test, it would bear the cost, “but 
38 Reid to Benoit, March 1, 1952. 
39 Reid to Benoit, March 1, 1952. 
40 Reid to Benoit, March 1, 1952. 
41 LAC, RG 76, Vol. 796, File 546-1-526, Part 1, Frost – Chief, Quarantine, Immigration Medical and Sick 
Mariners Services to Dr. Chown, March 1, 1957.
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where parties are submitting to it for the purpose of establishing identification and 
such identification is established the applicant should pay for the tests.”42 As with 
the requirement that residents of the People’s Republic of China undergo their 
X-ray examinations in Hong Kong, the financial fee associated with the medical 
test represented a punitive barrier.
In May 1957, the Canadian government moved to secure full blood tests for 
all family members, building upon its initial efforts to conduct routine blood tests 
on some family members and complete tests on others. Doubts about the reliability 
of the results led to an even more invasive process. This policy shift was largely at 
the behest of the Department of National Health and Welfare, which insisted that 
they would “not furnish opinions regarding parentage unless the complete test is 
conducted.” The Acting Director of the Immigration program concurred, noting 
“although this business of establishing identity by blood tests is an expensive and 
time consuming procedure” it was necessary “if we are not to be duped entirely 
by impostors.”43
 In the same year, a Dr. Bruce Chown of Winnipeg became responsible for 
reviewing all of the blood tests conducted in Hong Kong because of his expertise 
in the “MN” type of blood group testing.44 Each test cost approximately $25.00, 
which meant an outlay of about $75.00 for a family of three (father, mother, and 
child), plus additional charges for obtaining the samples and transporting them to 
Winnipeg.45 This represented a considerable price tag. Although the government 
recognized that such an outlay was “rather high,” the strength of the evidence 
reassured government officials and gave them considerable confidence about 
the quality of the tests being conducted, more so than had ever existed for the 
radiological exams conducted in Hong Kong.46 With the new arrangements, the 
greatest concern that confronted immigration officials in Ottawa was how to 
ensure that the blood samples arrived in Winnipeg from Hong Kong in a timely 
manner, without freezing en route.47 
For migrants, the results of the blood grouping had profound implications for 
how receptive the Canadian government was to their applications. A typical case 
summary read as follows: 
Case #1 Routine blood grouping conducted. Applicant in Canada (group “A”) wife 
in Canada (group “O”), alleged son in Hong Kong (group “AB”). This case has 
been referred to National Health and Welfare for confirmation. Appears that these 
persons could not be the parents of the child, and that the group “O” woman could 
42 LAC, RG 76, Vol. 796, File 546-1-526, Part 1, Chief, Admissions Division to Director, October 15, 1957.
43 LAC, RG 76, Vol. 796, File 546-1-526, Part 1, Acting Chief, Admissions Division from Asian Section, 
May 29.
44 “The MN blood group system is under the control of an autosomal locus found on chromosome 4.” Tests of 
this blood group can be used to confirm hereditary relationships. See MN Blood Group system in Humans, 
accessed May 19, 2014, https://www.mun.ca/biology/scarr/MN_bloodgroup.html. 
45 LAC, RG 76, Vol. 796, File 546-1-526, Part 1, Acting Chief, Admissions Division from Asian Section, 
May 29.
46 Frost to Chown, March 1, 1957.
47 See correspondence in LAC, RG 76, Vol. 796, File 546-1-526, Part 1.
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not give birth to a group “AB” child. This would rule out the possibility of her 
claiming him as an illegitimate son. 
Case #2 – Routine blood grouping conducted in Hong Kong. Canadian born 
woman, her alleged husband, and four alleged sons. Grouping showed one “son” 
could not be their child. Woman was informed that she could return to Canada, but 
that no action would be taken regarding the other members of the family unless 
they told the truth. 
Case #3 – Routine blood grouping conducted in Hong Kong. Wife (group “O”) son 
(group “O”) – Applicant to undergo test in Canada – No report yet.48 
 
Case #4 – Routine blood group conducted in Hong Kong. Wife (group “AB”) son 
(group “B”) – Request for grouping of applicant in Canada. He can be “A” or “B” 
but not “O”. Grouping also requested on one son in Canada.49 
As the summaries above reveal, families could be torn apart, depending on 
the outcome of the blood group test results. The results also forced important 
decisions about whether or not to proceed with sponsorship applications and 
one can imagine the strain that negative decisions might have had on household 
relations, not to mention migrant aspirations. 
Shifting Immigration Priorities
The legal, regulatory and discretionary circumstances in which families made 
decisions evolved over the postwar period. While there was considerable consensus 
in the 1950s between visa officers and medical practitioners in Hong Kong and 
immigration officials in Ottawa about the desirability of using medical testing to 
ensure the integrity of the immigration program, this consensus gradually eroded. 
As a result, there were significant disagreements between officials in Ottawa and 
Hong Kong about how liberally to interpret the results of medical examinations. 
Until the 1960s, it was often staff in Ottawa who insisted on a more hardline 
approach. By the mid-1960s, however, the archival evidence suggests that it 
was civil servants in Ottawa who were prepared to be more generous in their 
interpretation than their colleagues in Hong Kong. 
The reason for this shift can be traced to the more general inclination 
towards migration from China by the 1960s, as evidenced by popular sentiment 
and incremental efforts to create truly universal regulations in 1962 and 1967. 
Somewhat ironically, the shifts within Canada placed officials at odds with their 
counterparts in Hong Kong, as the staff at headquarters became more liberal in this 
later period. Those responsible for delivering the program on the ground remained 
generally suspicious. In 1966, the Canadian visa office in Hong Kong dealt with a 
family whose medical conditions were outlined as follows: 
48 Applicant refers to the father / husband who was attempting to sponsor his wife and child to Canada. 
49 LAC, RG 76, Vol. 796, File 546-1-526, Part 1, Blood Tests as a Means of Establishing Identity in Chinese 
Cases, May 29, 1957. 
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Father: born 15 Feb 23- a cook. Certified 5/C Pulmonary tuberculosis, moderately 
advanced, inactive. POOR RISK. Subject to chest surveillance. 
Mother: born 27 Jan 26. Certified 5/C Pulmonary tuberculosis, minimal. Inactive. 
FAIR RISK. Subject to chest surveillance. 
Daughter. Born 6.3.52. Certified 5/C Friederich’s Ataxia or Variant of it; 5/C Talipes 
equinus varus (club feet), partially corrected. POOR RISK. Diagnosis obtained 
from the Pediatric Specialist, Queen Elizabeth Hospital (HK Government). 
Son: born 10.3.58. Certified 5/C Friederich’s Ataxia or Variant of It. POOR RISK. 
Diagnosis obtained from the Pediatric Specialist, Queen Elizabeth Hospital (Hong 
Kong Government).50 
Officials in Hong Kong were inclined to refuse the family’s application because of 
the potential burden they placed on the Canadian health care system. The doctor 
on staff reported, “On re-examination the son’s vision has deteriorated from 20/40 
each eye to 20/200 each eye in two years and I am having him assessed by the 
ophthalmologist.” This meant that they were “poor risks.” In a family of four, 
there was only one breadwinner. Staff in Ottawa disagreed, and the application 
was allowed to move forward. This led to complaints that on occasions where 
the medical staff in Hong Kong encountered “individuals of families with 
very serious medical disabilities,” they were nevertheless allowed to proceed 
to Canada, because of “considerable pressure on the immigration Service in 
Canada.” In correspondence with decision-makers in the Immigration Branch, Dr. 
Willis conceded:
… our business here (in Hong Kong) is to judge the examinees medically as fairly 
and thoroughly as possible and submit the facts. Whether they are admitted or 
not is not our affair, but it seems to me that we also have the duty to bring to 
your attention instances where admission of such cases would create medical and 
financial problems that would be undesirable from the overall standpoint of the cost 
and difficulties of providing medical and health services to Canadians, which is one 
of the legitimate interests of our department.51
Pressure from family members in Canada, and other supporters, on occasion 
influenced the admission process in favour of the aspiring migrants, regardless 
of the extensive medical examinations undertaken in Hong Kong. Crucially, 
officials were open to considering applicants when the integrity of the system 
was not in doubt and where disagreement hinged on the extent to which potential 
migrants might place a burden on the Canadian health care system. By the 1960s, 
immigration officials were so confident about the use of medical testing that the 
focus was not on securing identities but rather on securing the best migrants. Over 
50 LAC, RG 76, Vol. 1207, File 5630-1, Part 1, Medical Officer-in-Charge, Hong Kong to Director, Overseas 
Region, Medical Services, Ottawa, June 6, 1969.
51 Medical Officer-in-Charge, Hong Kong to Director, Overseas Region, Medical Services, Ottawa, June 6, 
1969. 
Medical Testing and Chinese Migration to Canada
170 Histoire sociale / Social History
the course of two decades, the climate around Chinese migrants as permanent 
settlers had evolved to such an extent that even though the government continued 
to use medical admissibility testing to limit the scope of potential admissions, 
officials were now much more inclined to be generous in their interpretation, and 
in their use of admission criteria, with the result that medical testing did not serve 
the striking exclusionary function that it had two decades prior. 
Conclusion
After the end of the formal exclusion era in Canada, Chinese migrants encountered 
new barriers to admission in the form of demanding and expensive medical 
testing. Although this testing was meant to be applied uniformly to all migrants 
seeking permanent admission to Canada, medical testing was used for ancillary 
exclusionary purposes based on the longer, and larger, history of excluding Chinese 
migrants from permanent settlement in white settler societies. Chinese migrants, 
for whom leaving the People’s Republic of China was already difficult due to 
emigration restrictions, found additional barriers in their pursuit of migration 
opportunities overseas. X-rays were difficult to obtain, and immigration officers 
treated the quality and reliability of the X-rays that were presented with suspicion. 
As technologies for screening health issues evolved in the two decades under 
study, particularly with the introduction of blood tests, they became powerfully 
appealing to immigration officials disinclined to encourage migration from China. 
Medical technologies, when wielded as technologies of governance and control, 
continued to make migration difficult for people from China. 
Focusing on medical admissibility testing provides important insights into 
the nature, character, depth, and breadth of immigration reforms in the postwar 
period. Although the accepted narrative points to increasingly open and tolerant 
selection criteria among most white settler societies from the mid-twentieth 
century, the instrumental use of medical admissibility testing points to a more 
complicated narrative. This narrative includes migrants determined to overcome 
subjective barriers to entry and who therefore challenged subjective medical testing 
results, as well as conflicts and disagreements amongst officials responsible for 
administering the medical screening programs over the extent to which exclusion 
should be pursued, and how. 
Medical testing both shaped, and was shaped by, the landscape that governed 
global migration in the mid-twentieth century. As migrants navigated increasingly 
complex systems of governance and control, they were cognizant that at every 
step of the way the possibility for exclusion existed alongside the possibility of 
admission. Medical testing, a seemingly scientific and neutral practice, was in fact 
a fraught enterprise that was subject to political contingencies, racism, and larger 
program pressures. In the hands of officials still unconvinced about the merits 
of migration from China, it became a strategy for achieving exclusion by other 
means until migrants, and their supporters, were able to exert sufficient political 
influence to force a re-examination of how the grounds for inclusion and exclusion 
were conceptualized. 
